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Waiving Goodbye to Arbitration:
Factoring Prejudice When a Party
Delays Assertion of its Contractual
Right to Arbitrate
Elliott v. KB Home N.C., Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Annually millions of homeowners invest in HardiPlank, a cement fiber lap
siding made to look like wood or masonry, to protect the exterior of their newly
purchased homes from severe weather conditions. 2 In North Carolina however,
hundreds of new homeowners were left without an important installation compo-
nent of HardiPlank-weatherproof material. Joining together, three plaintiffs and
other similarly situated individuals filed a class action lawsuit against KB Home,
the installers of HardiPlank, in 2008.4 Over the next three years, the plaintiffs
spent approximately $100,000 to participate in four pretrial hearings, to take or
defend twenty depositions all over the country, and to engage in comprehensive
discovery in preparation for their day in court.5 On April 12, 2012, three and a half
years after plaintiffs first filed the case, KB Home filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration, asserting that the mandatory arbitration clauses in its New Home Purchase
and Warranty Agreements' required arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims.6 After
years of preparation for the class action, Plaintiffs were unable to continue their
lawsuit seeking compensation for the negligent installation of HardiPlank.
This note addresses the lawsuit described above, Elliott v. KB Home N.C.,
Inc., concerning whether KB Home waived its contractual right to arbitration by
waiting three years to assert that right, which ultimately prejudiced a class of
plaintiffs pursuing litigation against it.8 After examining how North Carolina
courts decide whether to compel arbitration, this note will analyze the four-factor
test North Carolina courts use to determine whether a party has sat on its right to
arbitrate for too long, subjecting itself to waiver of arbitration. Finally, this note
contends that North Carolina's four-factor test, as opposed to a bright-line rule, is
the superior method for protecting against prejudice and for upholding the policy
favoring arbitration.
1. Elliott v. ICB Home N.C., Inc., No. 08 CVS 21190, 2012 WL 5385181 (N.C. Super. Nov. 2,
2012).
2. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
3. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *7.
6. Id. at *1.
7. Id.
8. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *8.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 5, 2008, Mark Elliott, Tor and Michelle Gabrielson, and Mich-
ihiro and Yoko Kashima (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") filed a putative class action
against KB Home Raleigh-Durham, Inc. ("KB Home") and KB Home North Car-
olina, Inc. ("KB Home NC") on their behalf and on the behalf of other similarly
situated plaintiffs.9 Plaintiffs filed the class action for claims arising out of the
negligent installation of cement fiber lap siding, 10 which KB Home had agreed to
install under its New Home Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") and its
New Home Limited Warranty Agreement ("Warranty Agreement")." Plaintiffs
alleged that the siding, known as "HardiPlank,"l2 KB Home installed did not con-
tain necessary weather-proof materials underneath its surface.' 3 Plaintiffs further
alleged that KB Home's failure to install the weather-proof materials violated
local building codes as well as the manufacturer's guidelines and standards.' 4 KB
Home and KB Home NC responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint,
which the court granted only for KB Home NC, on July 17, 2009.'1
In January of 2010, KB Home filed a third-party complaint against Third-
Party Defendant, Stock Building Supply, LLC ("Stock") for indemnity, breach of
contract, and negligence in relation to the Plaintiffs' suit.16 The third-party com-
plaint filed against Stock elevated the case under North Carolina law to an excep-
tional and complex business case.' 7 Plaintiffs then moved for class certification in
March of 2011.8 In opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for class certification and
nearly three years after the Plaintiffs had filed the case, on May 9, 2011 KB Home
asserted its contractual right to arbitration under the Purchase and Warranty
agreements in a brief to the court.' Despite KB Home's invocation of the arbitra-
9. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
10. Id. at *1. Specifically, the plaintiff class alleged breach of contract, breach of express warran-
ties, breach of implied warranties, negligence, negligence per se, unfair and deceptive trade practices,
and negligent misrepresentation. Id.
11. Cement fiber lap siding is a popular siding used on the exterior of 15% of new homes. The
siding is able to withstand severe weather and its aesthetically pleasing because of its look of wood or
masonry. See Sal Vaglica, All About Fiber-Cement Siding, THIS OLD HOUSE.COM,
http://www.thisoldhouse.com/toh/photos/0,,20569027,00.html.
12. The decision lists the siding as "HardiPlank" but the product website lists the siding as "Hardi-
ePlank." Hardieplank is a cement fiber lab siding that is used on 5.5 million homes. See Fiber Cement
Lap Siding, James Hardie (2013),
http://www.jameshardie.com/homeowner/products siding hardieplankLapSiding.py.
13. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
14. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, Elliott v. KB Home, Inc. No. 08 CVS 21190,
2012 WL 5385181 (N.C. Super. Nov. 2, 2012), 2012 WL 3279314.
15. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
16. Id.
17. Id The third-party complaint filed by KB Home elevated the case under North Carolina law to
"an exceptional and complex business case" under Rules 2.1 and 2.2 of the General Rules of Practice
for the Superior and District Courts. Id Other issues in this case pertaining to Stock are not addressed
in this note.
18. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1; see also Order on Class Certification, available at
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/KB%20Class%2OCert%200rder_02-27-
12(l).pdf. Plaintiffs gave notice to potential class members, and the period for opting-out of the class
action ended on April 30, 2012. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
19. KB Home opposed the class certification on the grounds that class issues did not predominate
over individual issues, the named plaintiffs did not represent the class, and that arbitration was a supe-
446 [Vol. 2013
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss2/8
Waiving Goodbye to Arbitration
tion provision, in February of 2012 the court certified the class, which included all
North Carolina homeowners who had contracted with KB Home to install a
weather-resistance barrier underneath the HardiPlank siding.20 KB Home filed an
interlocutory appeal of the class certification order,21 a motion to stay pending
arbitration, and a motion to stay against the unnamed plaintiffs in the event that
the court decertified the class.22 KB Home filed its motion to stay pending arbitra-
tion based on its belief that Plaintiffs' claims were subject to arbitration under the
Purchase and Warranty agreements entered into between the parties. 23
On August 28, 2012, the North Carolina Court of Appeals took up KB
Home's interlocutory appeal of the class certification order, while the Superior
Court of North Carolina continued the case as filed by the Plaintiffs. 24 The court
of appeals dismissed KB Home's appeal and remanded the case for trial, 25 leaving
the North Carolina Superior Court26 to rule on KB Home's motion to stay pending
arbitration. 27 The ruling on the motion to stay depended upon whether the court
found a valid arbitration clause to exist in the Purchase or Warranty agreements. 28
KB Home argued that Plaintiffs' claims should be resolved by arbitration, as
expressly stated in the Purchase and Warranty agreements between KB Home and
Plaintiffs, and that trial should be delayed until the parties first arbitrated the dis-
putes.29 KB Home also stated that it had properly asserted its right to arbitration. 30
rior method to resolving the disputes. KB Home Raleigh-Durham Inc.'s Brief in Opposition to Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Elliott v. KB Home, Inc. No. 08 CVS 21190, 2012 WL 5385181
(N.C. Super. May 9, 2011), 2012 WL 7464649.
20. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *L.
21. Id. KB Home appealed the class certification order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals and
filed a motion to stay pending appeal. Id The Court of Appeals denied the motion to stay pending
appeal. Id.
22. Id.
23. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1. In order to protect the unnamed class members' legal rights if
the appellate court decertified the class, a portion of the unnamed class, comprised of sixty-nine mem-
bers, filed a Motion to Intervene. Id; see supra note 14. The intervention, if granted, would have
allowed the unnamed plaintiffs to have their claims heard individually and in the alternative to the
class action, but within the statute of repose. Id. Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals later
dismissed KB Home's appeal of the class certification, the unnamed class members filed a motion to
voluntarily dismiss the motion to intervene without prejudice. Id. The court granted the motion. Id. at
*10.
24. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1.
25. Id.
26. The North Carolina Superior Court is a trial court. This particular action was filed in Wake
County, North Carolina. Wake County is one county in North Carolina that further subdivides its trial
courts into particular areas of the law. This action is in the Business Court. For more information, see
Courts in Wake County, THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM,
http://www.nccourts.org/County/Wake/Courts/Default.asp.
27. Two motions to stay were filed by KB Home for 1) the named plaintiffs and 2) the unnamed
plaintiffs of the class action filed against KB Home. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *1. The second
motion to stay was only filed in the event the court decertified the class. The first motion to stay also
applied to the third-party defendant, Stock. Stock argued against KB Home's motion to stay based on
its belief that no valid contract existed between the parties, and therefore no valid arbitration agreement
existed. Stock contended that there was no valid arbitration agreement because the subsequent indem-
nity agreement KB Home entered into with Stock did not contain a mandatory arbitration clause. The
court adopted Stock's argument and held that no mandatory arbitration agreement existed between
Stock and KB Home. Id. at *8-10.
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. KB Home also argued in its Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof of the Motion to Stay
that the plaintiffs must proceed to arbitration with KB Home because 1) the arbitration agreement falls
No. 2] 447
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Plaintiffs counter-argued that a valid arbitration agreement did not exist, and in
the alternative, that KB Home had waived its right to proceed to arbitration.3 1
Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that if a controlling arbitration agreement existed,
the Warranty Agreement's arbitration clause governed the proceedings because
Plaintiffs' claims related to repairs needed after purchase of KB Home's installa-
tion services, thus falling under the Warranty Agreement and not the Purchase
Agreement. 32 Plaintiffs further asserted that even if the Warranty Agreement's
arbitration clause applied, KB Home had waived its right to arbitration by waiting
three years to assert the right, by engaging in discovery not available in arbitra-
tion, by stipulating to the court's jurisdiction over the matter, and by failing to
assert arbitration in the Joint Case Management Report filed with the court in
September of 20l10.3 KB Home responded to the Plaintiffs' waiver argument by
stating that the company could not compel arbitration until the court had certified
the class.34
The Superior Court of North Carolina, Business Court Division 35 held that
even though a valid arbitration agreement existed in both of the Purchase and
Warranty agreements the parties entered into, KB Home "sat on its right to arbi-
trate for too long" and therefore waived its arbitration rights under the contracts
permanently.36 The court further held that the arbitration rights were waived be-
cause Plaintiffs had become prejudiced by preparing for and expecting litigation
of the claims.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts have long held that arbitration agreements are enforceable, given that
the parties have already agreed to arbitrate disputes or claims arising out of such
an agreement. Congress enacted the FAA to put arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other types of contracts and to ensure that these agreements would be
under the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore the claims are arbitrable and 2) parties entered into an
arbitration agreement that incorporated the standard "dispute resolution procedures of the American
Arbitration Association," thereby agreeing to let the arbitrator determine whether the claims are subject
to arbitration under the agreement. Defendant KB Home Raleigh-Durham Inc.'s Reply Brief in Sup-
port of its Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration as to Proposed Plaintiffs-in-Intervention, Elliott v.
KB Home, Inc. No. 08 CVS 21190, 2012 WL 4766944 (Sept. 25, 2012).
30. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *6.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. at *3 n.7.
33. Id. at *3. See also Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant KB Home Raleigh-Durham, Inc.'s Mo-
tion to Compel Arbitration of Intervening Plaintiffs, Elliott v. KB Home, Inc. No. 08 CVS 21190, 2012
WL 5385181 (N.C. Super. Nov. 2, 2012), 2012 WL 4341900 (N.C. Super. Sept. 12, 2012).
34. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *6.
35. The Superior Court of North Carolina, Business Court Division is a trial court. See THE NORTH
CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM, supra note 26.
36. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *8.
37. Id.
38. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); 9 U.S.C.S § 2. See also
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (noting the "national policy
favoring arbitration"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2, 10 (1984) (stating that Congress
enacted the FAA to declare a "national policy favoring arbitration"). For a detailed history of the
FAA, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution
ofFederal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1427-1429 (2008).
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upheld against the widely held judicial hostility toward arbitration at the time. 39
The courts' reluctance to apply the FAA to state cases, and certain types of claims,
ended in the 1980s when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a series of cases
giving force to the FAA. 4 0 Following the strong national policy in favor of up-
holding arbitration agreements, North Carolina enacted the Revised Uniform Ar-
bitration Act ("NCRUAA"), which is similar to the FAA. 4 1
North Carolina courts maintain a policy in favor of using arbitration to settle
disputes, including disputes as to whether a claim is actually subject to arbitration,
42 43by resolving these issues in favor of arbitration.42 In North Carolina, courts ap-
ply a two-part test to determine whether a party will be compelled to arbitrate.44
The two parts are: 1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and, if so, 2)
whether the particular dispute is within the agreement's substantive scope.45 This
section will address this test, including the burden of proof necessary to establish a
dispute's arbitrability.46 This section will also address the waiver defense, which
parties opposing arbitration may raise in response to an opponent's motion to
compel arbitration. Finally, this section will discuss the four-factor test that North
Carolina courts use to determine whether a party has been prejudiced by an oppo-
nent's untimely motion to compel arbitration, an a finding that weighs in favor of
waiver.
A. Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement
Whether a dispute is subject to arbitration has typically been an issue of law
for the courts to decide. 47 In order for a court to compel arbitration of a claim or
dispute, the claim or dispute must satisfy a two-part test. 48 This test, discussed by
39. AT&TMobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.
40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.1 et seq. (2004).
42. Johnston Cnty. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 414 S.E.2d 30, 32 (N.C. 1992); see also Cyclone Roofing
Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 321 S.E.2d 872, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Moses H. Cone Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
43. The NCRUAA is nearly identical to the FAA, and North Carolina courts have adopted similar
interpretations. See Sloan Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Beckett, 583 S.E.2d 325, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (noting
that "North Carolina's stance on arbitration is very close, if not identical, to the federal stance.")
44. Ragan v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 531 S.E.2d 874, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
45. In re W.W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d 534, 536 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). See also Ragan, 531
S.E.2d at 876 (noting that a trial court's determination to compel arbitration requires considering 1)
"whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and," if so 2) "whether the particular dispute is within the
agreement's substantive scope.").
46. "Arbitrability" is a term of art used to refer to whether a dispute is subject to arbitration. Wheth-
er a dispute is arbitrable may depend on national law establishing a court's jurisdiction over a particu-
lar dispute and laws or rules relating to arbitration itself. See Stavros Brekoulakis, Law Applicable to
Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex Fori, in ARBITRABILITY: INT'L & COMP. PERSP. (Loukas A.
Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis, eds., 2009).
47. Revels v. Miss Am. Org., 599 S.E.2d 54, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). This case pertains to a law-
suit filed by a former Miss North Carolina against the national pageant organization. Id. This case is
not to be confused with the case cited infra note 57, which is a lawsuit filed by the same former Miss
North Carolina but against the state pageant organization. On the federal level, the issue of whether a
dispute is subject to arbitration is resolved by a court. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995).
48. In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d at 802.
No. 2] 449
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the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Techs v. Communications Workers ofAmerica49
and adopted in North Carolina by Ragan v. Wheat First Securities, Inc.,50 requires
determining (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and, if so, (2) whether
the particular dispute is within the agreement's substantive scope.5' The burden of
proof for each part falls on the party seeking to compel arbitration of the claim or
dispute. 52 Under the first part, the party must prove the existence of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement.53 Under the second part, the party must show that the language in
the arbitration clause is sufficiently broad in scope to include the claim or dispute
the party seeks to arbitrate.54
Principles of contract law apply in determining whether part one of the test,
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, is satisfied.5 In Revels v. Miss
North Carolina Pageant Organization, the North Carolina Court of Appeals5 6
stated the principles of contract law that are used in this analysis throughout the
state.57 In Revels, Rebekah Revels 8 entered into an agreement with the state pag-
eant organization after she won the title of Miss North Carolina. The state pag-
eant organization and Miss Revels contractually agreed that she must not "d[o]
any act or engage in any activity which could be characterized as dishonest, im-
moral, immodest, indecent, or in bad taste, during her reign."60 The contract also
provided that if anything agreed to in the contract turned out to be untrue, the
contract would cease to exist and Miss Revels would no longer hold the title of
Miss North Carolina. 61 The contract included an arbitration clause for "any con-
troversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract."62
When nude photographs of Miss Revels were brought to the attention of the
state pageant organization, the organization forced Miss Revels to resign as Miss
North Carolina. As a result, she alleged breach of contract and sought specific
49. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
50. Ragan, 531 S.E.2d at 876.
51. In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d at 802; see also Ragan, 138 531 S.E.2d 874 at 876 (noting
that a trial court's determination to compel arbitration requires considering "I) the validity of the
contract to arbitrate and 2) whether the subject matter of the arbitration agreement covers the matter in
dispute.").
52. Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 423 S.E.2d 791, 794 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
53. Revels v. Miss Am. Org., 599 S.E.2d 54, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
54. Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 730-32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
55. In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d at 534, 536.
56. The North Carolina Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court in North Carolina. The
highest court is the North Carolina Supreme Court. For more information about the North Carolina
judiciary, see The North Carolina Judicial System, N.C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS. (2008),
http://www.nccourts.org/citizens/publications/documents/judicialsystem.pdf.
57. Revels v. Miss N.C. Pageant Org., Inc., 627 S.E.2d 280, 283 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
58. For more information behind the story of former Miss North Carolina, Rebekah Revels, see
Jeffrey Gettleman, A Miss North Carolina Loses Her Court Bid, N.Y. TIMES (September 13, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/us/a-miss-north-carolina-loses-her-court-
bid.html?ref-rebekahrevels.
59. Revels, 627 S.E.2d at 282.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The contract also stated that the arbitration clause would not interfere with the rights of the
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performance of the contract promising her the title of Miss North Carolina.64 Pur-
suant to the contract, the state pageant organization sought to compel arbitration,
which the trial court granted.s On appeal, Miss Revels only challenged the first
part of the test, namely, whether or a valid arbitration agreement existed.66 The
court found that Miss Revels did in fact have a valid agreement with the state
pageant organization, and thus the first part of the test was satisfied. The court
noted the requirements for a valid contract under state law, providing that a valid
contract is one in which there is mutual assent that shows a "meeting of the
minds" for each and every term in the contract, including arbitration clauses.68
The court also stated that if a party challenges the principle of assent, the court
must decipher the "intention of the parties" by examining the instrument the par-
ties agreed to execute. 69 In applying these principles of contract interpretation to
the arbitration clause in the Revels case, the court found that since Miss Revels
had signed the contract and initialed next to the arbitration clause, Miss Revels
had assented to the terms of the agreement. 70
Another contract interpretation principle, applicable in determining whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists, is that the "plain and unambiguous language"
must be upheld when construing a contract.71 In Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse &
Co.,72 Johnston County entered into a construction contract that included an arbi-
tration agreement73 and a consent to jurisdiction clause74 with R.N. Rouse & Co.75
When R.N. Rouse & Co. disputed the amount that the county owed it for the con-
struction project, R.N. Rouse & Co. filed a request for arbitration with the Ameri-
64. Revels, 627 S.E.2d at 282.
65. Id. The appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling on the motion to compel arbitration de
nova. Id at 283.
66. Id. at 283. The parties did go to arbitration before Miss Revels appealed. The arbiter dismissed
the case after Miss Revels refused to comply with the arbiter's order to produce the photos for discov-
ery purposes. Id at 282. Miss Revels attempted to appeal this decision but the court found that the
arbiter's decision to make the photos discoverable was part of the arbiter's "broad discretion." Id at
284.
67. Id. at 283.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also Gould Morris Elec. Co. v. Atl. Fire Ins. Co., 50 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. 1948) (ex-
plaining that contracts should be "construed and enforced according to their terms.").
70. Revels, 627 S.E.2d at 283. The court also contrasted Miss Revels' case with that of Sciolino v.
TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc., 149 N.C. App. 642, 645-46, 562 S.E.2d 64, 66, disc. review
denied, 356 N.C. 167, 568 S.E.2d 611 (2002) and Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 423 S.E.2d 791
(N.C. Ct. App. 1992). Revels, 627 S.E.2d at 283. In Sciolino, plaintiffs signed an agreement to be
bound by terms of a customer agreement that the plaintiffs never read. Id The agreement to be bound
was not signed or initialed by the plaintiffs. Id. In Miss Revels' case, she had signed and initialed the
contract, manifesting her objective assent to the agreement. Id.
71. Johnston Cnty. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 30, 34 (N.C. 1992).
72. Id.
73. The arbitration agreement stated: "[a]ill claims, disputes and other matters in question between
the Contractor and the Owner arising out of, or relating to, the Contract Documents or the breach
thereof . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitra-
tion Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise." Id. at 31.
74. The consent to jurisdiction clause stated: "[b]y executing a contract for the Project
the Contractor agrees to submit itself to thejurisdiction of the courts of the State of North Carolina for
all matters arising or to arise hereunder, including but not limited to performance of said contract and
payment of all licenses and taxes of whatever nature applicable thereto." Id. at 31-32.
75. Id. at 31.
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can Arbitration Association while the county filed a motion to stay the arbitration
in the superior court.76 Though the appellate court held that the consent to jurisdic-
tion clause conflicted with the arbitration clause, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the appellate decision.7 7 The court reasoned that the consent to
jurisdiction clause merely waived any party's objection to personal jurisdiction in
a North Carolina court, while the arbitration clause governed the resolution of
claims arising out of the agreement.7 8 The court found that the appellate court had
incorrectly read the consent to jurisdiction clause as a forum selection clause,
and by doing so, had rewritten the contract with a term not previously intended by
the parties.so In adopting the "plain and unambiguous meaning" of the contract,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the parties were in fact subject to
arbitration.8'
B. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
Part two of the test used in determining whether to compel arbitration re-
quires examining the arbitration clause and deciding if the claim or dispute at
82issue is within the scope of the agreement. In making this determination, courts
must consider the nature of the dispute and the language used to define the scope
83
of the arbitration agreement.
In Sloan Financial Group v. Beckett, the Sloan Financial Group hired Justin
Beckett to oversee the group's investments in Africa.84 Mr. Beckett developed a
separate investment fund for the company but Sloan Financial later discovered
that he stole significant amounts of money from that fund.8 5 Sloan Financial
Group and other subsidiaries sued Mr. Beckett for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
86
embezzlement, conversion, and breach of contract. Mr. Beckett sought a motion
to compel arbitration for all claims under Sloan Financial Group's partnership
agreement, 7 which mandated arbitration for employees who breached the agree-
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Forum selection clauses typically choose the law and the forum to hear disputes arising out of
the contract. Id. at 33. Consent to jurisdiction clauses list the court that has the jurisdiction or power
to hear the case. Id.
80. Idat 34.
81. Id.
82. See In re W.W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d 534, 536 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). See also Ragan v.
Wheat First Sec., Inc., 531 S.E.2d 874, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that a trial court's determina-
tion to compel arbitration requires considering 1) "whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and," if
so 2) "whether the particular dispute is within the agreement's substantive scope.").
83. See Sloan Fin. Group, Inc. v. Beckett, 583 S.E.2d 325, 330-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
84. Id. at 326.
85. Id. at 328.
86. Id In addition to suing Mr. Beckett, the subsidiaries sued Justin Beckett's wife, three named
employees, and unnamed employees. Id.
87. The arbitration agreement stated:
(a) To the fullest extent permitted by law, any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or to the Company's affairs or the rights or interests of the Mem-
bers including, but not limited to, the validity, interpretation, performance, breach or termi-
nation of this Agreement, whether arising during the Company term or at or after its termi-
nation or during or after the liquidation of the Company, shall be settled by arbitration in
[Vol. 2013452
8
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss2/8
Waiving Goodbye to Arbitration
ment. The trial court denied his motion to compel arbitration on all but one claim
alleged against Mr. Beckett. The court compelled arbitration of the breach of con-
tract claim, because the scope of the arbitration agreement only included the
breach of contract claim.89
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's de-
cision 9o not to compel arbitration based on part two of the test for determining
whether a party is compelled to arbitrate, the scope of the arbitration agreement.91
The appellate court held that the lawsuit was not subject to arbitration, and that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Beckett's motion to compel
arbitration, because the contested issues were not within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement. 92 Specifically, the court noted that the scope of an arbitration is
defined by the clear terms of the agreement.9 3 The court also stated that determin-
ing if an issue falls within an arbitration clause requires examining the relationship
between the claim at issue and the content of the arbitration clause; the claim must
have a strong connection to the clause's scope.94 The court ultimately determined
that Mr. Beckett sought to arbitrate all of the claims against him, most of which
were not connected to the subsidiary's narrow arbitration clause, which applied
only to issues "arising out of the agreement" and relating to "internal claims" of
the operating of the fund.9 5 The court concluded that a strong relationship did not
exist between the arbitration clause, which applied to internal claims, and the
claims against Mr. Beckett, which included more than simple internal disagree-
ments, and therefore, the claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 96
In determining a dispute's arbitrability under part two, North Carolina courts
resolve doubts in favor of arbitration, provided that the issue could fall within the
plain meaning of the arbitration clause's scope.97 Courts will not find a claim to be
arbitrable if the court must re-write the agreement to encompass the issue. 98 The
issue in Raspet v. Buck involved whether an "oral buy-out agreement" entered into
New York City by three neutral arbitrators in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the
American Arbitration Association.
Id.
88.Id. at 328, 479.
89. Sloan Fin. Group, Inc., 583 S.E.2d at 329. The arbitration clause in the contract stated:
SECTION 10.1. Arbitration; Waiver of Partition/Action for Accounting. (a) To the fullest extent
permitted by law, any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or
to the Company's affairs or the rights or interests of the Members including, but not limited to,
the validity, interpretation, performance, breach or termination of this Agreement, whether aris-
ing during the Company term or at or after its termination or during or after the liquidation of the
Company, shall be settled by arbitration in New York City by three neutral arbitrators in accord-
ance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association.
Id.
90. Review of the trial court's decision not to compel arbitration is de novo. Id. at 330.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 334.
93. Id. at 329.
94. Id. at 330-31.
95. Sloan Fin. Group, Inc., 583 S.E.2d at 332-33.
96. Id. at 333.
97. See Raspet v. Buck, 554 S.E.2d 676, 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
98. Id. at 679.
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during the creation of a partnership was subject to arbitration." Mr. Buck alleged
that the "oral buy-out agreement" required Ms. Raspet to give Mr. Buck "'buy-
out' money" from the joint management of the partnership's clients. 00 The con-
tract provided that to fall within the arbitration clause, all matters, including the
"oral buy-out agreement," must be "concerning, directly or indirectly, the affairs,
conduct, operation and management of the LLC."'O'
The Raspet court found that the partnership never came into operation and
therefore the "oral buy-out agreement" did not concern the "operation and man-
agement of the LLC."10 2 The court recognized that under North Carolina law, the
claim and the scope of the arbitration clause must have a strong relationship for
the parties to proceed to arbitration, 0 3 and that ambiguities about whether an issue
is arbitrable should be resolved in favor of arbitration, but only where a doubt
exists.' 0 In Raspet, the court had no doubt about whether the issue was arbitrable;
the issue was clearly not within the scope of the arbitration clause. 05
C. Waiver ofArbitration
If a court determines that a claim or dispute meets both parts of the test for
determining whether to compel arbitration, the issue will be subject to arbitra-
tion.106 A party, however, may intentionally or unintentionally waive its right to
arbitration, even if a claim is found to be arbitrable.i0 7 Under North Carolina law,
a party that does not act in conformity with its right to arbitration waives the right
to arbitrate, especially where the party opposing arbitration has been prejudiced by
the nonconforming behavior. 08  The North Carolina Supreme Court considers
four factors to consider in determining whether a party is prejudiced by the oppos-
ing party's failure to timely assert his or her right to arbitration. 0 9
In Servomation Corporation v. Hickory Construction Co., the North Carolina
Supreme Court found that the party seeking arbitration had not waived its right to
99. Id. at 677. The trial court held that a valid arbitration agreement did not exist, and therefore the
claims were not subject to arbitration. Id.
100. Id. Ms. Raspett and Mr. Buck formed the partnership entitled "Plan First" to handle financial
services clients jointly. The two were also employees of Select Capital Corporation, and Ms. Raspett
was Mr. Buck's supervisor. When Select Capital Corporation fired Mr. Buck, they told him to transfer
his Select Capital Corporation clients to another broker. Ms. Raspett was told by Select Capital Corpo-
ration to cease all business operations with Mr. Buck, so Mr. Buck and Ms. Raspett signed Articles of
Dissolution for "Plan First" after his name had been removed from jointly held client accounts. Mr.
Buck then asserted the "oral buy-out agreement." Id.
101. Id. at 678-79.
102. Id.
103. Raspet, 554 S.E.2d at 678.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 678-79. Specifically, the arbitration clause stated: "[tihe Members hereby agree to submit
to arbitration any and all matters in dispute and in controversy between them and concerning, directly
or indirectly, the affairs, conduct, operation and management of the LLC, to the end that all such
disputes and controversies be resolved, determined and adjudged by the arbitrators." Id at 678.
106. Ragan v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 531 S.E.2d 874, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
107. Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Const. Co., 342 S.E.2d 853, 854 (N.C. 1986).
108. Herbert v. Marcaccio, 713 S.E. 2d 531, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Servomation Corp., 342
S.E.2d at 854).
109. Servomation Corp., 342 S.E.2d at 854.
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arbitration because the party opposing arbitration had not been prejudiced." 0 The
court identified the following factors to be considered when determining if a de-
layed motion to compel arbitration will prejudice a party:
(1) the party is forced to bear the expense of a long trial;
(2) the party loses helpful evidence;
(3) the party took steps in litigation to its detriment or expended signifi-
cant amounts of money on the litigation; or
(4) If the party seeking to compel arbitration has made use of judicial
discovery procedures not available in arbitration."'
The plaintiff, Servomation Corporation, filed a suit against Hickory Construc-
tion Company for negligent installation of a warehouse roof.112 Hickory Construc-
tion answered by asserting several affirmative defenses, including that Servoma-
tion failed to arbitrate the dispute as agreed to under the installation contract.113
Hickory Construction also moved for summary judgment, one year later, on the
ground that the claim was subject to arbitration, which both the trial and appellate
courts denied on the basis of waiver."l 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that Hickory Construction's right to arbitrate had not been waived
because there had not been a "long trial" to spend money on, evidence had not
been lost, and Hickory Construction had not utilized any discovery regularly una-
vailable in an arbitration proceeding." 5
Servomation argued that a substantial amount of money had been expended
on interrogatories and on providing a defense for Hickory Construction's mo-
tion for summary judgment, which had been filed one year after Servomation
initiated the action." 7 The Court found that the money expended on interrogato-
ries would have been spent anyway in arbitration.18 The Court noted that no evi-
dence in the record showed that providing a defense to the motion for summary
110. Id. at 855.
111. Id. at 854.
112. Id. at 853.
113. Id. Article Seven of the contract that Servomation and Hickory Construction entered into states
that "[aill claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or
the breach thereof. . shall be decided by arbitration . . . unless the parties mutually agree otherwise."
Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 318 S.E.2d 904, 906 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
114. Id. at 853-54. In moving for Summary Judgment, Hickory Construction also asserted that the
statute of limitations time-barred the claim. Id Hickory Construction also moved for, in the alterna-
tive, a motion to stay to compel arbitration. Id at 854. The trial court denied the motions and the
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. Id Hickory Construction petitioned the North Carolina
Supreme Court for discretionary review. Id. In reviewing the case, the Court remanded it back to the
Court of Appeals. Id. The Court of Appeals determined that Hickory Construction had waived its
right to arbitration. Id. Hickory appealed again to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id
115. Servomation Corp., 342 S.E.2d at 854.
116. Id. Hickory Construction had submitted sixty-one interrogatories to Servomation. Servomation
answered the interrogatories prior to Hickory Construction filing a motion to stay. See Servomation
Corp., 318 S.E.2d at 906.
117. Servomation Corp., 342 S.E.2d at 855.
118. Id. at 854-55.
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judgment required substantial cost."19 The Court held that Servomation was not
been prejudiced when Hickory Construction asserted its right to arbitrate, in its
answer and its invocation of arbitration one year later.120
In Herbert v. Marcaccio,121 the North Carolina Court of Appeals expanded
upon the third factor pronounced in Servomation Corporation v. Hickory Con-
struction Co. 122 In finding prejudice, the Court of Appeals relied on the principle
that if one party has incurred significant costs in pursuit of a lawsuit, another party
that could have, but did not timely move for arbitration, waives its right to arbi-
trate.123 The plaintiff, Herbert, was the executor of the estate of Ms. Shirley Sykes.
Ms. Sykes had been injured in a motor vehicle accident with the defendants, John
Douglas and Kaye Harrison Marcaccio, but died before resolution of her case.124
In 2007, Ms. Sykes filed a claim against the Marcaccios for the personal injuries
she suffered as a result of the accident.125 The Marcaccios began to prepare for
trial by sending interrogatories to Ms. Sykes, who refused to answer.126 On No-
vember 30, 2009, nearly two years later and facing sanctions for failing to respond
to discovery, Ms. Sykes127 filed a motion to stay pending arbitration. The trial
court denied the order and Ms. Sykes appealed.128
The North Carolina Court of appeals affirmed, finding that Ms. Sykes had
waived her right to arbitration.129 The court noted that arbitration, like any other
contractual right, may be waived and that the party opposing arbitration may be
prejudiced if the right is not timely asserted.130 The court also pointed out that the
party opposing arbitration may be prejudiced if it had incurred significant expens-
es that would have been avoided if the advocate of arbitration had timely moved
to compel arbitration.' 3 ' The court concluded that the defendants' insurance com-
pany incurred significant costs in preparation for litigation and were therefore
prejudiced by Ms. Sykes' delay in asserting her right to arbitrate.132
119. Id. at 855.
120. Id. Hickory Construction's answer and invocation of the right to arbitrate were included in its
motion for summary judgment The court also stated that had either party moved for an early hearing
on the defendant's motion to stay, the issue would have been resolved at the hearing. Id
121. Herbert v. Marcaccio, 713 S.E.2d 531 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
122. Id at 535-36 (citing Servomation Corp., 342 S.E.2d 853).
123. Id at 537.
124. Id at 533-34. Nannette Herbert filed a motion to intervene in the action and a motion for a
hearing on the competence of Ms. Sykes, requesting that Herbert be appointed as Ms. Sykes' guardian.
Id. at 534. Herbert alleged "that there [was] a genuine, material, and substantial question of whether
[Ms. Sykes] was competent" when she initiated the action against the Marcaccios. Id. The motions
were granted, but Ms. Sykes died two months later. Id
125. Id. at 533.
126. Herbert, 713 S.E.2d at 533-34.
127. Ms. Sykes' first attorney was her son. He later withdrew. Nanette Herbert took over after it was
believed that Ms. Sykes was incompetent when she entered into the action against the Marcaccios. Id
128. Id at 534-535. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration because Ms. Sykes pro-
ceeded with litigation by using discovery that was not available in arbitration. Id. at 534. By waiting
to compel two years later, the Marcaccios had spent significant amounts of money in pursuance of the
lawsuit. Id These circumstances, according to the trial court, amounted to the Marcaccios being
prejudiced. Id
129. Id. at 537.
130. Id at 535 (citing Douglas v. McVicker, 564 S.E.2d 622, 623 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
131. Id. at 536 (citing Culberson v. REO Props. Corp., 670 S.E.2d 316, 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
132. Id. at 535-36.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The decision in Elliott v. K.B. Home NC, Inc. relied on the reasoning of North
Carolina courts, as discussed above, to determine whether a motion to compel
arbitration was necessary in this complex business case. The Elliott court first had
to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement existed and whether the claims
alleged against KB Home were within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 33
The court also had to address whether the waiver defense, asserted by Plaintiffs,
applied to KB Home's contractual right to arbitration.' 34 After analyzing the case
under the two-part test and assessing the waiver defense, the court held that KB
Home had a contractual right to arbitration but had "sat on its right to arbitrate for
too long," therefore waiving its right to arbitrate the Plaintiffs' claims under the
contracts.'35 The court reasoned that KB Home had waived its right to compel
arbitration when it failed to assert its right to arbitrate for three years after the
Plaintiffs' filed their claims against it, all the while pursuing litigation against KB
Homes, and incurring the attendant expenses.36
The court began its analysis of whether to compel arbitration by noting its
adoption of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and by recognizing the
general enforceability of arbitration agreements in the state.'37 The court also not-
ed that KB Home, as the party seeking arbitration, had the burden of proof in sat-
isfying the two-part test to compel arbitration.'3 To meet this burden, KB Home
argued that a valid arbitration agreement existed in each of the plaintiffs signed
Purchase Agreements and signed Warranty Agreements.' 39 Plaintiffs responded by
claiming that only the Warranty Agreement applied and that this agreement's
arbitration clause was not mandatory.140
To resolve whether a valid, mandatory arbitration agreement existed, the El-
liott court examined the agreements according to principles of contract interpreta-
tion, as outlined in Revels v. Miss North Carolina Pageant Organization, Inc. and
Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Company. 141 The court concluded that the
"plain and unambiguous" language of the Purchase Agreement showed that the
parties intended to resolve their disputes through arbitration.142 Specifically, sec-
tion 35 of the Purchase Agreement signed by Plaintiffs stated that "[i]n the event
of any dispute related to the [home] or this Agreement.. .then this Agreement shall
be subject to arbitration under the [FAA]."I43 In finding that a valid arbitration
133. Elliott v. KB Home N.C., Inc., No. 08 CVS 21190,2012 WL 5385181, at *2 (N.C. Super. Nov.
2,2012).
134. Id. at *6-8.
135. Id. at *8.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *2 n.4.
138. Id. at *2; see also In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 671 S.E.2d 534, 536 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
139. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *2.
140. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs argued that the Purchase Agreement did not apply to this dispute because the
purchase of HardiPlank had already occurred. Id.
141. Id. The court pointed out that the contract must show mutual assent or a willingness to be bound
by the terms of the agreement. The court also pointed out that it would look at the "plain and unambig-
uous language" of the arbitration agreement to determine its validity. See discussion supra Part illA.
142. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *3.
143. Id. Section 35 of the Purchase Agreement also stated that mediation would occur first. Id. If
mediation did not resolve the dispute, then the parties would enter into arbitration. Id. "Mediation and
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agreement existed in the Purchase Agreement, the court noted that Plaintiffs did
not argue against the existence of an arbitration clause in the Purchase Agree-
ment.14
Next, the court considered the Plaintiffs' assertion that arbitration under the
Warranty Agreement was not mandatory, but voluntary.145 Plaintiffs asserted that
section E.2(G) of the Warranty Agreement allowed for arbitration as one option in
resolving the dispute because the clause stated "shall not be required to proceed to
Arbitration."1 46 In examining the "plain and unambiguous" language of the con-
tract as a whole, the court found that Plaintiffs were required to proceed to arbitra-
tion before pursuing litigation.147 The court rejected Plaintiffs' reasoning that
arbitration was not mandatory, noting that the Plaintiffs were merely examining
one sentence of one paragraph in the agreement. 148 The Warranty Agreement, the
court explained, first mandated that the parties resolve any dispute with a negotia-
tion conference. 149 Section E.3 of the Warranty Agreement stated that if the initial
negotiation conference did not resolve the dispute, parties seeking to resolve the
issue in another forum must next use arbitration.' 5 0 The court explained that Sec-
tion E.2(G), which the Plaintiffs relied on for their contention that arbitration was
not mandatory under the agreement, actually provided that parties were not re-
quired to arbitrate their dispute if they were able to successfully resolve it during
the initial negotiation conference.' 5 ' If Plaintiffs sought to resolve the dispute
beyond the initial negotiation conference, then the parties had to use arbitration; it
was only optional that the Plaintiffs continue to resolve the dispute.152 Based on
the court's reading of the agreements, it concluded that a valid, mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement existed between Plaintiffs and KB Home in both the Purchase and
Warranty Agreements.' 53
Next, the court turned to the second part of the test for determining whether to
compel arbitration; whether the issues in dispute were within the scope of that
agreement.154 The court noted that under Raspet v. Buck, ambiguities about
Arbitration of future disputes that may arise between the parties. In the event of any dispute related to
the [home] or this Agreement, the parties shall first mediate their dispute.. and if mediation does not
settle the dispute, then this Agreement shall be subject to arbitration under the [FAA]." Id.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id. at *4. Section E of the Warranty Agreement sets out an informal negotiation process to
resolve disputes that must be completed first. Id. As part of the negotiation, parties must "participate
in a conference." Id. Plaintiffs argued that one excerpt from section E precluded mandatory arbitra-
tion. Id. That section states:
If, after such Conference . .. the entire Dispute has not been resolved, the [Plaintiffs] may, but
shall not be required to, proceed to Arbitration as described in Subsection 3, below. If, as a result
the Conference, certain issues in the dispute have been resolved, the parties shall jointly state in
writing the issues that have been resolved and the issues which remain unresolved and will re-
quire Arbitration. Although Arbitration is the next formal and required step in the dispute resolu-
tion procedure, the parties may continue to negotiate informally to resolve the dispute....
Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *4-5.
149. Id at *4.
150. Id
151. Id
152. Id. at *4-5.
153. Id. at *5.
154. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *5.
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whether an issue is arbitrable must be construed in favor of arbitration, but also
that the clear terms of the agreement governed whether the issue was subject to
arbitration.'5 5 The court analyzed Sections 35.1156 and 35.3 157 of the Purchase
Agreement, which required arbitration of "all claims, demands, disputes, contro-
versies, and differences that may arise between the parties."15 The court found
that under the broad, inclusive language of the Purchase Agreement's arbitration
clause, all of Plaintiffs' claims were subject to arbitration. 159 Section 35.3 of the
Purchase Agreement did, however, exempt warranty claims from arbitration.16 0
The court reasoned that even if the Purchase Agreement exempted a claim from
arbitration, the Warranty Agreement's arbitration clause would cover the claim
because the Warranty Agreement's arbitration clause applied to "any dispute"
under the agreement.' Because all potential claims fell under the scope of either
the Warranty or Purchase Agreement's arbitration clause, all of the Plaintiffs'
claims were arbitrable.162 Although it found that arbitration should be compelled
under the two-part test, the court still had to determine whether KB Home had
waived its right to compel arbitration. 6 3
The Elliott court recognized that a party may waive its right to arbitration by
sitting on its rights for too long, and by prejudicing the party opposing arbitra-
tion.' The court used the four factors announced by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, in Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., to determine whether
KB Home's delayed motion to compel arbitration would prejudice the Plain-
tiffs.'6 5 The court also cited the Herbert v. Marcaccio decision, where the North
Carolina Court of Appeals found that prejudice existed for parties that had in-
curred expenses that could have been avoided, had the party seeking arbitration
timely asserted its right.166 In support of a finding of prejudice, Plaintiffs argued
that significant amounts of money had been expended toward litigation, KB Home
155. Id
156. Section 35.1 of the Purchase Agreement states:
[A]ll claims, demands, disputes, controversies and differences that may arise between the
parties to this Agreement...of whatever nature or kind, including, without limitation, dis-
putes: (A) as to events, representations, or omissions, which predate this Agreement; (B)
arising out of this Agreement; and/or (C) relative to the construction contemplated by this
Agreement arising prior to the Closing shall be submitted to binding arbitration....
Id.
157. Section 35.3 of the Purchase Agreement states:
[T]his section shall not apply to any repairs or warranty claims with respect to the [h]ome
arising after the construction is completed and the Closing has occurred hereunder and shall
expressly NOT control over the dispute resolution provisions in the Warranty [Agreement]
for such repairs or warranty claims. . . . [A]ny such repairs or warranty claims shall be gov-
erned by the Warranty [Agreement] coverage disputes provisions of the Warranty [Agree-
ment].....
Id.
158. Id. at *5.
159. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *5-6.
160. Id. at *5.
161. Id at *5-6.
162. Id.at *6.
163. Id.
164. Id at *6, *8.
165. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *6 (citing Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Const. Co., 342 S.E.2d
853, 854 (N.C. 1986)).
166. Id. at *7.
No. 2] 459
15
Sanocki: Sanocki: Waiving Goodbye to Arbitration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
engaged in discovery not available in arbitration, and more than three years of pre-
trial litigation had already occurred by the time that KB Home asserted its right to
arbitration, on April 12, 2012.167
The court in Elliott was persuaded that Plaintiffs had incurred significant
costs in preparation for litigation, over $100,000,168 but found that Plaintiffs had
not endured a long trial or the loss of important evidence. 6 9 The court did, how-
ever, find that the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs could have been avoided had
KB Home asserted its right to arbitrate three years earlier, in 2008, when Plaintiffs
had first filed their action.'7 0 Stating only in a footnote of its opinion, the court
commented that it was not required of KB Home and not determinative of finding
prejudice that KB Home assert its right to arbitration in its Answer to the Petition
or in its responses to Plaintiffs' discovery.' 7 The court, instead, found that due to
KB Home's delay in seeking arbitration, the Plaintiffs had spent money unneces-
sarily on: four pre-trial hearings,172 twenty depositions taken across the country,
and securing expert witnesses.' 73 The court concluded that KB Home had acted
inconsistently with its right to arbitration by not timely asserting the right,174 and
that the Plaintiffs were prejudiced under the factors announced in Servomation.
Therefore, the court denied KB Home's motion to stay pending arbitration for
sitting "on its rights to arbitrate for too long."s7 5 This conclusion, according to the
court, made it unnecessary to determine which arbitration agreement-the War-
ranty or Purchase Agreement-governed the Plaintiffs' claims.'7 6
167. Id. Plaintiffs argued that KB Home did not assert its right to arbitration under April 12, 2012,
when KB filed its motion to stay; however, KB Home first asserted its right in its brief opposing class
certification on May 9, 2011. See supra note 19.
168. Id. at *7. The court noted that the $100,000 spent by Plaintiffs accounted for preparing and at-
tending negotiations, depositions, motions, hearings, and hiring expert witness. Id. at * II n.30.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Id. at *7. The Plaintiffs first filed the action on December 5, 2008. Id. at *1. In a footnote of its
opinion, the court commented that KB Home was note required to assert its right to arbitration in its
Answer to the Petition or in its responses to Plaintiffs' discovery, and that its failure to do so was not
relevant to the prejudice analysis. Id. at *11 n.28.
171. Elliott, 2012 WL 5385181, at *7 n.28.
172. Plaintiffs spent money on the following four pre-trial hearings: KB Home's Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery of KB Home, Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and
KB Home's Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. Id at *11 n.31.
173. Id. at *7.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *8. The court also denied the motion to stay against the unnamed class members, granted
the motion to dismiss the Motion to Intervene filed by the unnamed class members, denied the Motion
to Intervene filed by the unnamed class members, and did not award Plaintiffs requested attorney's
fees. The court denied the motion to stay against unnamed class members even though KB Home
argued that it could not have asserted its right to arbitration until class certification on February 27,
2012. The court did not adopt KB Home's argument, finding that compelling arbitration to the un-
named class members would prejudice the named plaintiffs, rendering the class action meaningless.
The court also pointed to the fact that KB Home knew the named plaintiffs were seeking a class action.
Id. at *6-8.
176. Id. at *11 n.24.
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V. COMMENT
North Carolina courts have long upheld the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion.'77 Following federal law, North Carolina adopted its own version of the FAA
to ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. Yet,
in recognizing a waiver of this contractual right to arbitration, one must consider
whether the waiver defense is contrary to the aforementioned policy favoring
arbitration. This section considers whether a "factor test" or a bright-line rule is
the method of determining whether a party has waived its contractual right to
arbitration that is more consistent with the policy favoring arbitration. Ultimately,
this note argues that the North Carolina four-factor test, though at times unpre-
dictable, allows courts to properly consider each waiver claim on a case-by-case
basis. A case-by-case analysis, unlike a bright-line rule, would not automatically
bar arbitration, simply because the party seeking to compel it has filed a respon-
sive pleading. Finally, a factor test allows for more disputes to be resolved by
arbitration, supporting the policy favoring arbitration.
A. Bright Line Rule Establishing Waiver After A Defined Period of Time
The policy favoring arbitration originated with the federal courts, beginning
in the 1980s.17 9 States, following the growing national policy in support of arbitra-
tion, began to adopt similar provisions and legal interpretations to uphold arbitra-
tion agreements.' 80 Federal circuit courts generally take either one of two ap-
proaches in determining whether a party has waived the right to arbitration.' 8'
Most federal circuit courts will find waiver if, after examining a series of factors,
the court determines that the party opposing arbitration has suffered prejudice.' 82
A minority of federal circuit courts have adopted a bright-line rule that sets a time
177. See Johnston Cnty. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 30, 32 (N.C. 1992) (holding that
courts resolve doubts about whether a claim is subject to arbitration in favor of arbitration); Cyclone
Roofing Co., Inc. v. David M. LaFave Co., Inc., 321 S.E.2d 872, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the
strong presumption in favor of arbitration); Capps v. Virrey, 645 S.E.2d 825, 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that whether a claim is arbitrable is resolved in favor of arbitration).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.1 (2004).
179. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)
(noting that "due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration"); see also 6 C.J.S.
Arbitration § 3.
180. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 3.
181. This issue would not be contested had the parties in Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A. not
settled their dispute. Previously, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.
The issue would have been whether the FAA requires that a party must show prejudice after the party
seeking arbitration waived its right to arbitration by participating in litigation. The issue would have
resolved the circuit split discussed in this comment. Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 58
So.3d 366, 367-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Stok & Associates, P.A., v. Citibank, N.A., 131 S.Ct.
2955 (2011) (mem.) (dismissing writ of certiorari).
182. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812
Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "[t]he waiver determination
necessarily depends upon the facts of the particular case and is not susceptible to bright line rules");
see also Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a three factor test is applied in determining whether a party has waived the right to arbi-
tration: the party knew of the right, acted inconsistently, and the party became prejudiced).
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after which a party can no longer compel arbitration, usually when the party seek-
ing arbitration has filed a responsive pleading.183
Most parties enter into arbitration agreements for their predictability, effi-
ciency, and to avoid the costs of litigation.'84 Factor-tests eliminate these benefits.
Adopting a factor-test to determine whether a party has waived its right to arbitra-
tion eliminates the predictability of that the bargained-for forum, as the plaintiff
can seek this analysis in any forum. Factor-tests also allow the court to use its
discretion in determining whether the totality of the circumstances calls for a
waiver of a party's contractual right to arbitration, or whether parties must pro-
ceed to arbitration.'85 Because each case possesses a unique set of circumstances,
factor-tests make it difficult for parties to clearly ascertain whether or not their
conduct, or that of their opponent, would constitute a waiver of their right to com-
pel arbitration. Conversely, a bright-line rule that establishes a point at which
waiver will be presumed,186 would allow parties to better predict whether a de-
layed motion to compel arbitration would result in the waiver of the right. Addi-
tionally, a bright-line rule would keep parties from investing in pre-trial litigation,
only to later be compelled to arbitrate. The bright-line rule forces parties not to sit
on their right to arbitrate by signaling that asserting the right as early as possible is
the only way to keep it.
A bright-line rule, though providing predictability, is not the superior method
for determining waiver because it may unnecessarily take away a party's contrac-
tual right to arbitrate. Anthony DeToro disagrees with a bright-line rule that treats
the filing of responsive pleadings, or the initiation of a lawsuit, as a waiver of the
right to arbitrate.' 87 DeToro supports his argument by noting that the commence-
ment of litigation is not always inconsistent with the party's right to arbitration. 8
Several types of lawsuits, such as injunctions or writs of attachment, are unavaila-
ble in arbitration, and therefore, do not conflict with a party's contractual right to
pursue arbitration of the dispute.'89 DeToro contends that under a bright-line rule,
a party seeking an injunction on one issue and arbitration on another would be
barred from asserting arbitration once the party filed a suit for injunction.190
Adopting a rigid bright-line test would effectively reduce parties' contractually
183. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding "that an election to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contrac-
tual dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate"); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v.
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a defendant "who has not invoked the
right to arbitrate on the record at the first available opportunity, typically in filing his first responsive
pleading or motion to dismiss, has presumptively forfeited that right").
184. See generally Lawrence W. Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictability of Proce-
dures, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1323 (2009).
185. See Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
party has waived its right to arbitration if the party, "under the totality of the circumstances," has acted
inconsistently with its right to arbitration and by doing so has prejudiced the other party) (citations
omitted).
186. The period of time will usually be after a responsive pleading has been filed. See Elliott v. KB
Home N. C., Inc., No. 08 CVS 21190,2012 WL 5385181, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 2,2012).
187. Anthony DeToro, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 21
CUMB. L. REV. 615, 625 (1991).
188. Id.
189. Id DeToro advocates for a factor test that takes into account the delay in seeking arbitration and
the prejudice the delay caused the opposing party. Id. at 625-26.
190. Id at 625.
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agreed upon right to arbitrate, and would not be in keeping with the national poli-
cy in favor of arbitration.191
Although DeToro's reasoning is correct, an easy solution to his argument
would be to extend the bright-line rule past the period of filing a responsive plead-
ing. Courts could draw the line after a discovery schedule had been set, after two
years had lapsed since the first pleading had been filed, 192 or, following Texas'
lead, when a party has substantially invoked the judicial process.193 The problem,
however, with any bright-line rule is that if the line is drawn too early, as DeToro
notes, the parties' contractually bargained-for decision to arbitrate is taken away
unnecessarily. In such situations, the party seeking to compel arbitration may not
have actually acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate, and the party opposing
arbitration may not be harmed by the delay. If the line is drawn too late in the pre-
trial process, arbitration is not taken away unnecessarily, but the party who initiat-
ed the litigation may suffer extensive loss, including the money spent pursuing the
claim in court. A bright-line rule drawn later in the pre-trial process also unfairly
awards a party who sat on its right to arbitrate and attempted to use discovery
procedures not available in arbitration to develop evidence and testimony to be
used later in arbitration.194
Despite a factor-test's potential for unpredictable outcomes, the factor-test is
superior to a bright-line rule is both overly narrow and overly broad.. A factor-test
can be used to most accurately determine when a waiver has actually occurred, by
considering both the prejudice to the party opposing arbitration, and whether the
delay is so insignificant that compelling arbitration would be harmless.
B. Factor-Test Establishing Waiver Based on Prejudice
The North Carolina four-factor test, though at times unpredictable, allows
courts to properly consider each potential waiver on a case-by-case basis and does
not create a rigid statute of limitations for compelling arbitration. North Carolina,
following in the footsteps the Fourth Circuit,1 9 5 has adopted a set of factors to
consider when determining whether a party has been prejudiced by the delay in
the assertion of another party's right to arbitrate.196 The factor test is based upon a
showing of prejudice against the party opposing arbitration, but takes into account
other circumstances that a court following a bright-line rule would fail to consid-
er.'97 These circumstances, discussed supra, include: whether a party has taken
191. Id. at 618-620.
192. See Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that a delay in seeking
arbitration for almost two years after pre-trial proceedings was not enough to find waiver of arbitra-
tion).
193. See In re Citgo Petroleum Corp., 248 S.W.3d 769, 778 (Tex. App. 2008) (stating "[s]ubstantially
invoking the judicial process can occur when the proponent of arbitration actively tried, but failed, to
achieve a satisfactory result in litigation before turning to arbitration") (citation omitted).
194. For a discussion on the discovery procedures allowed in arbitration, see THOMSON REUTERS,
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO ADR TECHNIQUES § 2:20.
195. See Microstrategy Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] party may
waive its right to insist on arbitration if the party 'so substantially utiliz[es] the litigation machinery
that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay' and that a delay in
seeking arbitration is a factor) (citations omitted).
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advantage of discovery not available in arbitration, the loss of helpful evidence,
the amount of time that has passed, the amount of money spent on litigation, and
whether a party has endured a long trial.198 Indeed, the Second Circuit has recog-
nized that filing discovery past the responsive pleading stage may not prejudice a
party and therefore may not waive arbitrable claims.199 A simple lapse in time,
which a bright-line rule might use to determine when a waiver occurs, does neces-
sarily not mean that the outcome of the parties' dispute has been affected, and
does not mean that compelling arbitration will necessarily harm a party's interests.
Under a bright-line rule, the court would take an all-or-nothing approach that
would invalidate arbitration agreements simply after a party has engaged in the
beginning stages of litigation.20o By taking an all-or-nothing approach that bright-
line rules require, scholars have argued that courts would invalidate arbitration
agreements entirely, which is neither the intention of the FAA nor the intention of
the policy in favor of arbitration. 201 A factor test based on a finding of prejudice to
the party opposing arbitration is the best way to uphold the policy favoring arbi-
tration without unfairly awarding a party who sits on its right to arbitrate for too
long. By using a factor-test, rather than an all-or-nothing rule, to determine
whether a party will be prejudiced by a delayed motion to compel arbitration, the
Elliott court's progeny will be able to uphold a greater number of arbitration
agreements while also protecting the parties to a dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Elliott, the North Carolina Superior Court found that KB Home's delay in
seeking arbitration caused the Plaintiffs prejudice. The court reasoned that KB
Home sat on its right to arbitrate for too long, and in doing so, waived it. The
court reached this decision after examining several factors. The court could have
decided to find waiver because KB Home's delay in seeking arbitration caused the
plaintiffs prejudice, or the court could have established a bright-line rule prohibit-
ing arbitration rights from being asserted after a specified period of time. The
court opted for determining waiver by factoring in whether the Plaintiffs had been
prejudiced by KB Home's delay in making its motion to compel arbitration.
The Elliott decision's multi-factor analysis allowed the court to best uphold a
policy favoring arbitration. Although bright-line rules provide more predictability,
they may also unnecessarily strip parties' of their contractual right to arbitration,
based merely on the passage of time, or the filing of a reply brief. As the Elliott
court noted, the mere passage of time may not have an impact on a party's claims.
By adopting a factor-test for waiver, courts can balance the effects of the passage
198. Id.
199. See also Nesslage v. York Sec., Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
"[p]arties can conduct discovery with respect to non-arbitrable claims without waiving their right to
arbitrate arbitrable claims").
200. See Elliott v. KIB Home N.C., Inc., No. 8 CVS 21190,2012 WL 5385181, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Nov. 2, 2012).
201. See Diana M. Link and Richard A. Bales, Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements after Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International , 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
275 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.eduldrlj/vol11/iss2/5 (arguing against a
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of time with other factors that may reveal whether a party has suffered prejudice
as the result of his opponents delay. Ultimately, factoring in prejudice to deter-
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